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This thesis studies intermediate repair planning at the
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) level. Maintenance infor-
mation system initiatives (Naval Aviation Logistics Command
Management Information System (NALCOMIS) /Naval Aviation
Logistics Data Analysis (NALDA)/AIMD Performance Management
System (APMS) ) and an analytical "systems" model (Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP) ) are examined. The study concludes
that information system initiatives provide the performance
measurement orientation and information processing base
required in support of NAVAIR "tactical" planning. It
further concludes that complex logistics problems can be
"modeled" through the AHP. AHP is a promising technique for
integrating performance information and expert opinion into
a hierarchical, multiple objective planning structure. It
provides a method for determining resource requirement
priorities in support of readiness goals. The study recommends
that research be expanded to include developm.ent of a NAVAIR
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Within weeks of the United States' entry into World War 1,
the following discussion took place between destroyer squadron
skipper Captain Taussig and Commanding Chief of the British
Forces, Admiral Bayly [Ref . 1: p 295]
:
(Bayly) "At what time will your vessels be ready for sea?"
(Taussig) "I shall be ready when fueled."
(Bayly) "Do you require any repairs?"
(Taussig) "No, sir."
(Bayly) "Do you require any stores?"
(Taussig) "No, sir. Each vessel now has on board sufficient
stores to last for seventy days."
(Bayly) "You will take four days rest. Good morning."
One of the most significant lessons of military history,
relearned as recently as 1973 when the U.S. faced a crisis
in the Middle East, is one related to capability assessment
and resource allocation. Measuring capability, or effec-
tiveness, and effectively allocating resources to improve
that capability, are largely dependent on the ability of
command echelons to assess realistically the degree of pre-
paredness of subordinate units/commands, correctly identify
and communicate their resource requirements , and direct
efforts toward an optimal degree of readiness and deployability
.
The lesson, in and of itself, is easily understood. It
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is intuitively obvious that there is some functional inter-
relationship between resource inputs and output measured in
terms of capability. What is not understood is the decision
process which determines resource allocations on the basis
of an integrated analysis of capability variables. In an
age of increasingly com.plex logistics and increasingly limited
budget resources, it is the "readiness to resources" decision
process that has become a principal concern of Congress and
the Department of Defense (DOD)
.
Defense program requirements can no longer be explained
"...narratively in terms of broad logistics problems..."
[Ref. 2: p. 18] and justified on the basis of "...historical
trends and the application of experienced judgment..." [Ref.
2: p. 15] . The experiences of the last two decades have
driven home the reality of resource constraints. Between
1965 and 1968, escalating costs associated with financing
the Vietnam War forced strategic planners to cut back dras-
tically defense capital investment (the Navy purchased 80
percent fewer ships during that period as compared with sim-
ilar pre-1965 periods) . During the post-Vietnam era, a
public insistence on genuine cutbacks in defense expendi-
tures coupled with a crippling inflationary spiral forced
the Department of Defense (DOD) to "...cut back its force
structures, reduce training, slow down force modernization,
and accept shortfalls in spare parts..." [Ref. 3: p. 27].
More recently, recession-caused budget revenue shortfalls
11

have forced strategic and tactical planners once again to
determine how best to allocate scarce resources.
The budget process, which essentially establishes the
program justification requirement, is "...simply an extension
of our basic political system" [Ref. 4: p. 277]. As such,
budgetary politics reflect the everpresent conflict between
agency "advocates" and budget "guardians" and the driving
influences of social, political, and economic trends.
Inherent in fiscal, political, and allocative objective
decisions is the classic "guns versus butter" trade-off. The
budget process is not designed to serve "...as a device for
national planning" [Ref. 4: p. 277]. Nevertheless, competing
agencies lobbying for an increased share have experienced
a growing requirement to substantiate a national priority,
demonstrate agency program planning, and specifically relate
agency output to resource input. With Congress facing a
fiscal year 1984 budget proposal of $280 billion in budget
authority for the national defense function and outlays
expected to approach $245 billion in 1984, $285 billion in
1985, and $323 billion in 1986, it is not likely that the
agency program requirement to relate output to input will
diminish [Ref. 5: p. 5-8].
In defense of a "controllable" line item in the fiscal
year 1976 budget, the Navy attempted to justify a $26.2
million increase in training command flight hour funding by
citing a need to improve readiness. In refusing the request.
12

Congress contended that a readiness deficiency was not
discernable from readiness information presented as
justification [Ref. 6: p. 33].
The flight hour funding example is representative of the
basic problem facing agency office planners. The problem,
simply stated, is one of developing at each program level
"...credible capability assessment systems that measure output
activity versus resource input in terms of readiness"
[Ref. 7: p. 40].
It is recognized at the outset that there are no simple
answers. The readiness to resources problem even within a
specific functional area is extremely complex. Nevertheless
it seems appropriate that attempts to structure decision in-
formation and processes be discussed in an effort to define
process variables and identify the interrelationships. While
it is unlikely that anyone will discover "...a simple, use-
able definition of (capability) , a means of measuring it,
and some perfectly definite input-output relationship"
[Ref. 8: p. 21], it is equally unlikely that "new" knowledge
is needed. It is felt at the outset that better applications
of what is already known can serve to reduce the apparent
complexity of large systems to manageable proportions and
quantifiable terms.
B. SCOPE AND APPROACH
This thesis studies Naval Aviation Maintenance Program
(NAMP) intermediate level repair capability as it relates to
13

readiness determination and resource allocation at the Naval
Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) level. The study focuses on
systems command problems relevant to assessing the repair
readiness of individual Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance
Departments (AIMD'S), determining resource requirements in
an effort to improve readiness at the intermediate level,
and relating those resource requirements to budget dollars
in support of the OPNAV/NAVAIR strategic capabilities
planning task.
Specifically, this study deals with "modeling" the Inter-
mediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) readiness to resources
problem through an application of the Analytic Hierarchy
Process (AHP) to the Logistic Management Institute's AIMD
Performance Management System (APMS) . Chapter II develops
the concept of capability at the congressional, DOD, and
NAMP level to establish a "common ground" on term definition.
Chapter III provides an overview of the NAMP and a description
of the intermediate level repair/supply/information process
.
Chapter IV coordinates the information contained in chapters
II and III through a discussion of NAMP maintenance data system
(MDS) initiatives/shortfalls and their relationship to the
planning tasks assigned to Navy offices. Chapter V discusses
decision theory and decision support systems. Chapter VI
discusses current AIMD performance measures and development of
the Logistic Management Institute's (LMI's) AIMD Performance
Management System (APMS) . Chapter VII incorporates APMS into
14

the "readiness" taxonomy presented in chapter II. Application
of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to the taxonomy is
discussed as a potentially valuable technique for developing
a NAVAIR tactical planning decision support system. Chapter
VIII presents conclusions and recommendations.
15

II. TEE CAPABILITY CONCEPT
A. GENERAL
The basis for the process of allocating "scarce" resources
is the determination of priority between various and com-
peting system requirements. While that seems relatively
simple, it is not. The determination of priority assumes,
in the first place, that there is an understood objective
based upon, secondly, a systematic measurement process.
Throughout chapter I, the terms capability, readiness, force
effectiveness, and preparedness were used interchangeably.
That was not done to create a definitional issue. There is
no single dimension that captures all that is meant by the
term capability. In some defense articles capability is
used interchangeably with readiness while in others a dis-
tinction is made between readiness and sustainability as
separate components of capability.
Admiral Thomas B. Hayward in a prepared statement pre-
sented to the Senate Armed Services Committee in support of
the fiscal year 1983 Defense Authorization for Appropria-
tions stated "...nothing is more relevant to the (capability)
of our naval forces to carry out their assigned mission in
peace or war than their state of readiness, in all its
ramifications." That statement implies that readiness is a
multi-dimensional element of capability. The statement
16

assumes a "universal" understanding of both capability and
readiness. In fact, a great deal of confusion still exists.
The lack of understanding is apparent in the absence of a
clearly defined "capability" objective at the strategic
program level and a consequent absence of "agreed upon"
"readiness" measures at the tactical planning and operational
control levels of management. Poorly defined objectives and
inadequate performance measures have compounded tremendously
the complexities associated with the already difficult deci-
sion processes involving trade-offs between investments in
equipment, manpower, training, operations, maintenance, and
logistics support.
B. CAPABILITY DEFINED
In developing the concept of capability, it is necessary,
at the outset, to present a premise that will be developed
throughout the chapter. The premise is that "capability" is
"readiness over time". Readiness is based on the under-
standing that "...wars are fought in the present, not in the
future... (and) should be viewed from a short term perspec-
tive..." [Ref. 9: p. 67]. Capability is "...the more inclu-
sive concept" [Ref. 3: p. 2]. It is a strategic concept in
the sense that it recognizes a changing environment and
projects readiness requirements planning into the future.
While not precise, this distinction has been accepted by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) . They define readiness as
17

"...the degree to which the organization is capable of per-
forming the missions for which it was organized or designed"
[Ref . 10: p. 7-2]
.
C. HISTORICAL/LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
A discussion of several historical and legislative
references to "readiness" identifies specific dimensions of
the term and serves to illustrate elemental aspects of the
"capability" concept.
Admiral Bayly clearly viewed the readiness of Captain
Taussig's destroyer as conditional on the unit's ability to
operate at sea. In 1954, Admiral Jerauld Wright, during his
tour as Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, insisted
that his Command's primary mission was to "...be ready to
fight a war tomorrow morning before breakfast." Along the
same lines. Admiral "Cat" Brown, during his tour as Commander,
U.S. Sixth Fleet in 1956, considered readiness to be related
to requirements associated with the problem of keeping the
fleet alive and fighting for at least forty-eight to seventy-
two hours after the commencement of open hostilities. What
underlies all three examples is, first, a dimension concerned
with a units '/forces ' ability to perform at the start and,
second, a dimension concerned with how long the unit/force
can sustain a given level of performance. Certainly at an
operational level, these two dimensions, preparedness and
sustainability, drive assessments. Implied in the examples.
18

however, are two additional dimensions. It is reasonable
to expect that each unit coimnander, prior to assessing
degrees of preparedness and sustainability , had considered
the existing threat environment and, in that regard,
previously evaluated the dimensions of force structure and
force modernization.
The four readiness dimensions presented in Figure II-l
constitute an assumption fundamental to the remainder of
this study. The assumption is that readiness is a tactical
objective made up of four objective elements - preparedness,
sustainability, force structure, and force modernization.
This assumption is based on the readiness elements identified
in a 1980 study by the American Enterprise Institute
entitled The Problem of Military Readiness (see reference
list) . It is interesting to note that, while the objective
elements are "unofficial", they form the definitional basis
for a 1982 U.S. Government Accounting Office report entitled
Evaluation of DOD's Readiness Report in Response to Public
Law 96-342 (see bibliography)
.
The four readiness objective elements considered sepa-
rately do not provide an adequate understanding of the term.
If they did, it would be relatively easy to weight the
dimensions, measure each, and develop an overall index.
Readiness "...focuses on systems taken as a whole, not on
their parts taken separately" [Ref. 11: p. 27]. As such,







































relationships between parts of the system: how the parts
fit together and interact" [Ref. 11: p. 27]. In assessing
the readiness of a system, the effect of degraded performance
by any subsystem must be analyzed in terms of its relationship
to every other subsystem.
Legislative attempts to deal with readiness began, in
1977 with the publication of Senator John C. Culver's report
entitled "The Readiness Crisis". Citing the low "readiness"
of U.S. combat forces. Senator Culver attributed readiness
problems to an overemphasis by DOD planners on force m.oder-
ization. He recommended that a higher priority be assigned
to improved combat readiness and the monitoring of readiness
indicators. One significant element of Senator Culver's
report was his recognition of "readiness" as "...a somewhat
imprecise concept, incorporating both quantitative and
qualitative judgments" [Ref . 12: p. 3].
Senator Culver's report led the Senate Armed Services
Committee to recognize "...significant differences . . .in. .
.
readiness reporting criteria" and the often impossible task
of relating "...proposed expenditures to specific, planned
changes in readiness" [Ref . 13: p. 140]. In late 1977,
congressional passage of the fiscal year 1978 Defense Auth-
orization Act, Public Law 95-79 Section 812, established the
requirement that "...the budget of the Department of Defense
...include data projecting the effect (on readiness) of the
appropriations requested for material readiness requirements.
21

In 1980, with the passage of Public Law 96-342, the reporting
requirement was extended beyond material readiness to include
data projecting unit combat readiness with regard to funds
requested. While the latter requirement was rescinded with
the passage of Public Law 97-86, it was rescinded because of
the tremendous definitional and assessment method problems
that agencies were experiencing and not because the require-
ment was not considered im.portant. The material readiness
reporting requirement still exists. It is clearly understood
by Congress and the DOD that the intent and direction is
toward a complete system that shows the "...readiness effect
of funding alternatives" [Ref. 2: p. 15].
D. PERSPECTIVE
Congressional inquiries relevant to "What is readiness?",
"How much does it cost to maintain?", and "How much more
readiness will "X" dollars buy?" are forcing the development
of quantitative readiness measures. Proxy measures, such as
operationally ready (OR) /mission capable (MC) rates and
experienced judgment, are being challenged as inadequate
program justification measures.
A standard resource-to-readiness methodology still
does not exist largely because of the definitional problem.
In hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee on
the fiscal year 1983 DOD Authorization for Appropriations,
Admiral Harry Train, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet,
22

stated that in assessing fleet "capabilities" he focused on
"personnel, readiness, and sustainability . " Admiral James
Watkins, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, on the other
hand, saw capability as unconstrained, "readiness" as "...
what percentage of unconstrained capabilities..." could be
brought to bear, and readiness measurement as requiring a
"...complex blending and interpretation of many indices"
[Ref . 14: p. 3075]
.
A final point establishes the transition from national
objectives to Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP)
objectives and the subject of this study. Underlying each
example is a basic mission or functional orientation.
Restating the JCS definition of readiness, the DOD Readiness
Management Streering Group defines unit readiness as "...
the ability of a force, unit, ship, weapon system or equipment
to perform the function for which it was organized or designed"
[Ref. 15: p. 3]
.
The NAMP "...provides an integrated system for performing
aeronautical equipment maintenance and all related support
functions" [Ref . 16: p. 1]. In keeping with the concepts
developed thus far, the program is mission oriented in its
direction, "dynamic" in its concept "...to support the Chief
of Naval Operations' (CNOs*) ...objectives..." (capability),
and structured in its organizational objective to govern the
"...management of organizational, intermediate, and depot
level aviation maintenance" [Ref . 16: p. 1-1-1].
23

A system for modeling the readiness to resources rela-
tionship is presented in subsequent chapters. It must be
understood prior to that presentation that strategic
"capability" is developed in response to mission require-
ments imposed by an environmentally sensitive "operational
concept". Readiness is the objective, or mission goal,
which is determined once the operational environment has
been defined. In Naval aviation maintenance, the readiness
objective is to provide the material support required to
meet aircraft "mission capable" goals. Structured readiness/
resource requirements information and performance measurement
systems are essential to that objective.
24

III. THE NAMP AND INTERMEDIATE REPAIR
A. BACKGROUND
The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) was estab-
lished in October, 1959 to provide an integrated system for
performing aeronautical equipment maintenance and all related
support functions. Because it is dynamic in nature, current
policies, procedures, and responsibilities for Naval Aviation
maintenance are the result of numerous changes and several
major revisions to the basic program document, OPNAVINST
4790.2. Major revisions include: (1) introduction of the
three-level maintenance concept; (2) incorporation of main-
tenance data collection, man-hour accounting, and aircraft
accounting systems through the introduction in 1965 of the
Naval Aviation Maintenance and Material Management (3M) system;
(3) development, in 1970, of a cohesive, command oriented
publication; and, (4) a fundamental format change in 1977.
B. ORGANIZATION
Administration and support for the NAMP are accomplished
through the chain of command. Responsible for the achievement
of maximum operational readiness of Naval Aviation systems
in support of missions assigned by the Secretary of the Navy,
CNO has "...provided the basis for the NAMP and ...established
policies for the assignment of maintenance responsibilities
to all activities of the naval establishment concerned with
the maintenance of naval aircraft" [Ref. 16: p. 2-1-1].
25

Coimnand responsibilities are assigned by CNO to Aircraft
Controlling Custodians (ACC's), including air type coirunanders
(Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic/Pacific) under their
respective fleet commanders. Chief of Naval Reserve, Chief
of Naval Air Training, and Commander Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIR) . ACC ' s serve as coordinating authorities
for the NAMP in the operating/training forces and maintain
responsibility "...for the maintenance and material condition
of aeronautical equipment assigned to their cognizance" [Ref
.
16: p. 1-3-1]. Specifically, the responsibility includes (1)
"...the accomplishment of repair of aeronautical equipment
and material at the level of maintenance which will ensure
optimum economic use of resources..." and (2) the "...use of
pertinent data in order to effectively improve material
condition and safety" [Ref. 16: p. 4-1-1]. Responsibility
for the coordination of maintenance performed by squadrons/
units is assigned by ACC's to specific commanders, functional
wing, fleet air wing, and carrier air wing commanders. Line
responsibility for the maintenance and material condition of
assigned aircraft rests with squadron commanding officers.
Support responsibility is assigned by CNO to the Chief of
Naval Material (CNM) . The CNM delegates specific responsi-
bilities for aviation maintenance to NAVAIR while retaining
responsibility for "...coordinating, monitoring, and apprais-
ing Naval Material Command actions to provide effective
aviation maintenance support..." [Ref. 16: p. 1-3-6]. NAVAIR
26

support responsibilities include "...coordinating authority
for the conduct of the NAMP. .., technical direction in matters
concerning naval aircraft. . .and associated material..., (and)
command and support responsibility over the Naval Aviation
Logistics Center (NALC) " [Ref. 16: p. 1-3-6]. NALC is
primarily tasked with coordinating and managing depot level
maintenance activities. The Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance
Support Office (AIMSO) is tasked with developing "...policies,
programs, and procedures to achieve optimum material readiness,
safety and economy in the application of all NAMP resources
at the intermediate level of maintenance: [Ref. 16: p. 1-3-8].
C. MAINTENANCE LEVELS/SUPPLY SUPPORT
The need for an integrated maintenance/supply system
capable of responding simultaneously to the "readiness" and
"resource management" goals of the command/support organiza-
tion structure led to implementation of the three-level
maintenance concept. Under the concept and in support of
the primary ACC responsibility, repair of aeronautical
equipment and material is accomplished at either the organi-
zational, intermediate, or depot level. Briefly described,
specific responsibilities of each level are as follows
.
1. Organizational Level
Organizational maintenance is defined as those equip-
ment upkeep functions normally performed by maintenance
personnel on a day-to-day basis in support of squadron
operations. Functions assigned to the Organizational
27

Maintenance Activity (OMA) include equipment inspection,
servicing, and handling as well as "on equipment" corrective
and preventive maintenance, technical directive incorporation,
and organizational level record keeping/reporting.
2. Intermediate Level
Intermediate maintenance, often refered to as "I"
level repair, is maintenance performed by designated activ-
ities in support of operating squadrons. Maintenance actions
performed by the Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA)
include calibration; "off equipment" repair/replacement;
repair/replacement of damaged or unserviceable parts, com-
ponents, or assemblies; accomplishment of certain periodic




Depot level maintenance is performed at depot facili-
ties (organic or contract) . Maintenance actions performed at
the Depot (DOP) constitute "rework" of materials requiring
major overhaul and include the complete rebuilding of parts,
sub-assemblies, assemblies, and end items, parts manufacture,
equipment modifications, and recleimation. Depots support
organizational and intermediate level maintenance activities
through engineering assistance and the performance of mainten-
ance beyond the capability of the lower level activities.
Supply support for the three-level concept is based on a
direct relationship between maintenance and supply elements
.
All maintenance organizations, regardless of size, have an
28

assigned supply activity to which material requests can be
directly submitted. The achieved level of integration and
coordination between these two complex organizational ele-
ments, maintenance and supply, largely determines repair
readiness and the success of the units' resource management
effort.
D. INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE
Intermediate maintenance is directed through a basic
framework of authority and functional maintenance/supply
interrelationships established by the NAMP standard
organization.
1. Organization
Repair at the I level is accomplished by the Aircraft
Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) both afloat and
ashore. The organizational structures presented in Figures
III-l and III-2 illustrate the management, staff, and pro-
duction relationships developed to materially aid in the
achievement of capability goals. Basic span of control,
functional alignment, and homogeneity/division of work
assignments are established through the standard organization.
As shown, the basic framework structures management authority/
responsibility, establishes quality assurance/analysis, admin-
istration, and the manpower, personnel, and training positions












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In addition to the personnel, facilities, and equipment
planning, organization, and administration responsibilities
normally associated with Department Head assignments, the
AIMD officer is responsible for "continuously and progres-
sively" analyzing the mission accomplishment/capabilities
of the department. This strategic responsibility emphasizing
maintenance/material planning establishes the direct main-
tenance/supply interrelationship fundamental to repair
capability development.
The AIMD officer is supported in his operational and
strategic responsibilities by the Maintenance/Material Control
Officer (MMCO) . As depicted in Figure III-2, the MMCO is
responsible for the overall productive effort and material
support of the department. He maintains "...liaison with
supported activities and the local supply department to ensure
material requirements and work load are compatible..." [Ref.
17: p. 2-6-1] and establishes procedures to monitor and
coordinate material requirements planning and repair capability.
Specific requirements for parts and material within the AIMD
are coordinated with the Supply Support Center (SSC) through
the Material Control Center (ashore) and the material section
of the Maintenance/Material Control office (afloat) . Material
Control Centers (MCC's) are responsible for the proper for-
warding of material requirements, expeditious routing of
received parts and materials, control of parts/material
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requistions, and the coordination of material ordering,
receipt, and delivery. MCC's are functional entities within
the maintenance organization serving as a single point of
contact with the supply organization's Supply Support
Center (SSC)
.
The Supply Support Center (SSC) is responsible for pro-
viding effective supply support to the AIMD. As a functional
element at the Aviation Stores division (S-6) level. Figure
III-3, the SSC serves as the single point of contact within
the Supply department for maintenance activities requiring
direct support. The center is divided into two sections.
The Supply Response Section (SRS) maintains responsibility
for material requests and material delivery. The Component
Control Section (CCS) manages repairables stored in Local
Repair Cycle Asset (LRCA) storage areas, undergoing repair
in the AIMD, awaiting parts (AWP) , or in process for shipment
to a depot repair facility (see Figure III-4).
E. MAINTENANCE DATA SYSTEM
The Maintenance Data System (MDS) was developed as an
integral part of the Navy Maintenance and Material Management
(3-M) system. It was incorporated into the NAMP in 1965 in
response to a recognized requirement for definitive opera-
tional, maintenance, and logistic support information. The
system standardizes data collection, coding, and processing
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it provides historical, trend, and statistical data to all
levels of management. MDS is designed to facilitate "...
the collection, analysis, and use of pertinent data..."
[Ref. 16: p. 1-1-1] in order to effectively improve material
readiness . It provides for the documentation of data
relative to the following:
* Maintenance personnel utilization
* Equipment maintainability and reliability
* Equipment mission capability and utilization
* Maintenance material usage
* Material non-availability
* Maintenance and material processing times
* Weapon system and maintenance material costing
Elements of MDS are shown in Figure III-5 and include:
* Man-hour Accounting (MHA)
* Maintenance Data Reporting (MDR)
* Material Reporting (MR)
* Subsystem Capability Impact Reporting (SCIR)
* Ground Support Equipment (GSE) inventory reporting
* Training Device Utilization Reporting (TDUR)
MDS is designed so that each individual, during the
performance of a maintenance or material requisitioning task,
converts a narrative description of the task into codes and
enters the coded information on standard forms or source
documents. The principal source document is the Visual
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(Figure III-6) which provides for the coded documentation of
equipment, system, component, malfunction, required parts,
and expended man-hours data elements. Information is
recorded on various copies of the 5-part document during the
intermediate repair cycle as depicted in Figure III-7.
Completed source documents are collected and transmitted to
a data services facility where the information is converted
to machine records. The machine records are subsequently used
to produce periodic and on-demand, standardized, summary
data reports designed to provide supervisors/managers with
the informational assistance necessary to support analyses
of maintenance and supply problems. Following local pro-
cessing, the information on the machine records is forwarded
to a central data services facility which aggregates the
data by weapon/support system in support of the informational
requirem.ents of aircraft controlling custodians, program
managers, and technical bureaus.
In general, MDS information flows through three related
cycles: (1) the local cycle, at the organizational and
intermediate levels of maintenance; (2) the local-central
cycle, between the local activity (ship or station) and the
Navy Maintenance Support Office (NAMSO) ; and (3) the central
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Figure III-6, Visual Information Display System/Maintenance
























IV. PLANNING "I" LEVEL REPAIR CAPABILITY
A. INTRODUCTION
The NAMP is a complexly integrated program through which
CNO mission objectives for naval aviation are translated
into "governing" support policies and procedures. Program
logistic support functions, while distinguishable in the
assignment of specific "I" level responsibilities, become
obscured in the complex planning decisions that affect readi-
ness. Clearly it is not now possible, as it might have been
at some tim.e in the past, to accurately determine whether a
particular degradation in an IMA's performance is directly
attributable to either maintenance or supply. Plans for
maintenance, plans for supply support, and maintenance/
supply functional interrelationships are much too complex
for that. Readiness has thus become an integrated planning
problem. Solutions to readiness problems are dependent on
the identification of critical performance measures and a
determination of resource requirements based on an analysis
of the complex interrelationships between those measures.
This chapter continues to provide background information
relevant to the readiness/resource planning problem. It
addresses the specific aviation planning responsibilities
assigned to various Navy offices, discusses existing and
planning information systems developed in support of those




As stated at the conclusion of Chapter II, strategic
"capability" is developed in response to mission requirements
imposed by an environmentally sensitive "operational concept"
,
Strategic planning is not an objective task. Instead, it is
a task closely related to the "pattern of decisions" involved
in the business community's development of a corporate
strategy. Corporate strategy "...(1) determines, shapes,
and reveals. . .objectives, purposes, or goals; (2) produces
principal policies and plans for achieving those goals; and
(3) defines the business..." [Ref. 18: p. 93]. In much the
same way, strategic planning in the naval aviation community
involves attempts to deal with the operational environment,
changes in mission/technology/etc., under conditions of
uncertainty. Strategic planning represents a "corporate"
effort to create an artificial environment within which the
"technical core" can perform with "certainty".
Readiness, on the other hand, is a tactical concept. As
such, it serves the annual programming and budgeting process.
Tactical planning is principally dependent on inform.ation
accuracy and reliable measurement systems. It involves
specific tasks associated with the development of procedures,
budgets, and schedules necessary to accomplish short-term
objectives in support of strategic goals.
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C. NAVAL AVIATION "PLANNING"
NAMP program direction results from the coordinated
strategic and tactical planning efforts of several Navy
offices
.
1. OPNAV (force strategic)
Force "capability" planning is accomplished by the
OPNAV Long Range Planning Group (OP-OOX) . Established in
1980, the group assists CNO in the development of a long-
range "operational concept". Four strategic planners, within
the OP-OOX structure, assist in the conduct of projected
operational environment studies, analyze navy/civilian tech-
nological initiatives, and coordinate the research and develop-
ment planning functions assigned to other CNO staff offices
in the principal areas of technology, politico-military,
resources, and programs. While "...most existing planning
focuses on specific action programs designed to produce . .
.
precisely defined results...", "...the long range planning
group will usually describe preferred outcomes for the whole
navy" [Ref . 19: p. 64]
.
2. OPNAV/NAVAIR (mission strategic)
Mission strategic planning specifically related to
naval aviation is accomplished by OPNAV and NAVAIR through
preparation of the 20-year Naval Aviation Plan (NAP) . Signed
jointly by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare)
,
(DCNO AIR, OP-05) , and the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command,
annual development of the plan is coordinated through the
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Aviation Plans and Requirements Division (OP-50) of OPNAV
and the office of the Deputy Commander for Plans and Programs
(AIR-01) of NAVAIR. The NAP reflects strategic policy in
providing mid-range planning guidance relevant to "...current
(five-year defense plan) FYDP approved force levels, FYDP
procurements/modification plans, and 15 year extended mission
projections of those plans" [Ref. 20: p. ]]. The NAP directs
tactical planning. It includes "...objectives and planning
data required to develop, procure, and maintain an aviation
force structure responsive to current and projected naval
roles and threats..." [Ref. 20: p. 2].
3. CNM/NAVAIR (tactical)
The task of "budgeting" material support for the NAP
falls essentially on the project offices of the Chief of
Naval Material (CNM) and the plans and programs divisions of
the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) . It is an
extremely difficult task. NAP objectives must be reduced to
program elements, alternatives must be identified, planning
data must be developed for each alternative, alternatives
must be analyzed in terms of support requirements, and support
requirements estimates must be translated into justifiable
budget figures in preparation for an on-going process of
program element/budget review. The tactical planning process




4 . AIMSO (strategic/tactical interface)
As a field activity of the OPNAV NAMP policy office,
AIMSO serves as the methods link between the "capability"
(strategic) planners at OPNAV and the "readiness/resource"
(tactical) planners at NAVAIR for intermediate maintenance.
A principal responsibility of the office is development of
the "I" level programs and procedures necessary to achieve
readiness/resource goals. This responsibility underscores the
present-day Congressional/DOD emphasis on measuring the
relationships between resources applied and missions accomp-
lished, utilizing performance measurements in determining
program/readiness improvement requirements, and developing
capability plans on the basis of evaluated readiness/resource
interrelationships
.
D. PLANNING SUPPORT SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
Naval aviation planning is supported by the aviation 3-M
system. As discussed earlier, incorporation of the MDS portion
of the aviation 3-M system into the NAMP was the significant
first step in what has evolved into an effectively integrated
and standardized operational, maintenance, and logistics
source data collection system. Numerous program modifications
demonstrate that "...the accumulation of definitive information,
and the eventual distribution of (that) information throughout
all levels of the naval aviation community has (been) a
paramount effort in naval aviation maintenance since the
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1960's" [Ref. 21: p. 9]. That notwithstanding, the inform-
ational demands of MDS system "users" are not being met. The
manual documentation and source document review process is
error-prone and time consuming. Additionally, the capability
of the 3-M system is increasingly limited by batch processing
procedures and electronic accounting machine (EAM) technology.
These limitations have resulted in man-machine interface
problems, a general lack of confidence in machine reports,
and minimal utilization of data analysts in their primary
area of responsibility. While it was recognized shortly
after implementation that "...the information required by...
management on which to base decisions (was being) rendered
stagnant by outmoded data systems..." [Ref. 21: p. 17],
budget limitations stonewalled the transition to "newer"
technology for years
.
In the late 1960 's, informational demands from operational
commanders concerned with aircraft readiness figures resulted
in several significant studies. The Carrier Aircraft
Maintenance Support Improvement (CAMS I) project was commis-
sioned in 1970 by the CNO to identify priority actions to
improve carrier aircraft readiness. The project concluded
that improved readiness could be achieved through increased
efficiency in the management of maintenance and support
functions, and that the most practical and cost effective
means of attaining essential levels of efficiency would be
through improved use of automated data processing equipment.
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In 1972, a follow-on project sponsored jointly by the Naval
Air Systems Command and the Naval Supply Systems Command was
adopted. Termed Shipboard Aviation Command Management
Information System (SACOMIS) , the project provided prototypes
for computerized 3-M MDS information systems. SACOMIS was
expanded to include air stations, air groups, and all aviation
ships and became the Naval Aviation Logistics Command
Management Information System (NALCOMIS) in 1974
XRef. 22: p. 46].
Similar informational demands by NAVAIR program divisions
tasked with integrated logistic support for weapons systems
resulted in simultaneous (early 1970) studies in data base
management systems. Those studies resulted in the develop-
ment of a NAVAIR corporate data base called the Naval Aviation
Logistics Data Analysis System (NALDA) . NALDA was commissioned
in May of 1976 and design certified in December, 1979.
E. INFORMATION SYSTEM OBJECTIVES
Under the sponsorship of OPNAV and the direction of
NAVAIR, a complex, computerized NAMP management information
system (MIS) is nearing the implementation phase of its
developmental process. Planned for incorporation at the
organizational and intermediate maintenance/supply levels,
the NALCOMIS portion of this integrated information system is
"...essentially a logical improvement to the NAMP. .. (resulting)
from technological improvements ... in the automated data
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processing field" [Ref. 22: p. 45]. The principal purpose
of NALCOMIS is to "...improve operational readiness...
through improvements, via automation, of aircraft maintenance
and supply management effectiveness" [Ref. 23: p. 2-1]. In
addition to VIDS/MAF automation, the system provides support
programs designed for each independent functional process
(OMA/IMA/SSC) and distributed data base design. It will do
much to correct existing 3-M system problems discussed earlier
The second major portion of this complex support system is
NALDA which provides, as its principal objective, a signif-
icantly improved logistics data analysis capability to CNM,
NAVAIR, and other activities tasked with support planning
(logistic) responsibilities. NALDA receives up-line trans-
fers of maintenance, supply, operations, material, configu-
ration, safety, and other logistics data from existing data
collection systems. In addition to the data provided by the
NAMP Maintenance Data System (MDS) , major aviation support
offices including the Aviation Supply Office (ASO) , Naval
Air Rework Facilities (NARFS) , the Naval Safety Center, and
the Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF) contribute
to the data base. Data, stored in a central integrated data
bank, is structured for processing by NAVAIR application
programs in support of NAVAIR tactical planning, source level
data analysis, and interactive query requirements.
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F. PROJECTED INFORMATION SYSTEM SHORTFALLS
In 1970, Robert N. Anthony, then Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) , advocated development of an integrated
data base system from which an infinite number of management
program applications could be made. He contended that "...
the plain fact is that the system designer cannot find out
what management needs to know. We discovered long ago that
it is futile to ask managers what data they need; they simply
cannot foresee the uses that might be made" [Ref. 24: p. 37].
Both NALCOMIS and NALDA support Anthony's view. Focusing
primarily on information collection, both programs provide
structure to the automation and management of input. It is
agreed that real-time access to accurate, integrated informa-
tion can improve the useability of output. It is argued,
however, that expanded information processing and task
management capabilities will do little to improve the stra-
tegic, tactical, and operational plans and decisions associated
with readiness/resource management unless they are directed
through a structured decision framework.
Walter Kennevan states that management information systems
(MIS's) support "...the planning, control, and organizational
functions of an organizaiton by furnishing uniform infor-
mation in the proper time-frame to assist the decision-m.aking
process" [Ref. 25: p. 302]. Expanding on Kennevan ' s definition,
it is important to recognize MIS characteristics detailed or




* Provides managers with complete, accurate, and timely
data.
* Structures and quantifies historical data.
* Provides for historical/trend analysis.
* Reports to each management level necessary degrees of
detail in an adapted form which minimizes the necessity for
further analysis.
NALCOMIS and NALDA are essential components of a "state
of the art" readiness/resource MIS. In conjunction with the
3-M system, they reflect the MIS characteristics presented.
Nevertheless, two significant shortfalls will persist fol-
lowing implementation of those existing programs that exist
today at the heart of the readiness-to-resources planning
problem. They do not (1) measure relationships between
resources applied and missions accomplished in (2) a framework
that facilitates tactical decision-making. As those measures
and the structure are undefined, so is the direction of
information gathering undefined, measurements of the relation-
ships between readiness and resources uncertain, and the




V. DECrSION' THEORY AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
The strategic/tactical planning process, through which
readiness is assessed, resource requirements are justified,
and capability is planned, depends principally on the effec-
tiveness of a decision support system which evaluates infor-
mation system elements in terms of decision variables
considered together. Information systems by themselves do
not support the "What if?" analyses essential to the planning
process. The absence of a decision support system at the
various management levels responsible for intermediate repair
precludes reliable accomplishment of "readiness" and
"resource utilization" NAMP objectives. This chapter examines
decision theory and essential elements of decision support
systems.
B. PERSPECTIVE
Decisions involve choices among alternatives. They are
the final result of an analysis of answers to repeated "VThat
if?" questions. Despite the dramatic progress that has been
made in integrating all of the various functional elements
associated with the collection of 3-M source data and the
information processing/formatting promise offered by NALCOMIS
and NALDA, little progress has been m.ade toward putting "current
information" to use in the readiness/resource decision process.
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The 3-M system is an efficient, complexly integrated MIS.
But, as McCosh and Morton point out in their book entitled
Management Decision Support Systems , MIS ' s "...(have) had
little significant impact on management. The kinds of deci-
sions and the ways in which they are made have been very
little affected..." by the availability of information.
While it is certainly true that information is fundamental
to the development of intelligent alternatives, MIS ' s essen-
tially serve "What is?" not "V7hat if?" needs. The "up-line
information transfer" provision built into 3-M assumes that
there is another formal planning support structure which
provides for the integration of strategic, tactical, and
operational functions between weapons systems support programs
when, in fact, there is not. The absence of such a "decision"
support system within the tactical planning and operational
control framework of intermediate level support is critical
and leads in almost every area to suboptimization along
program lines. "AIMD managers currently do not have the
capability to relate their actions to the readiness of the
aircraft they support" [Ref. 26: p. 2-2]. Without that
readiness to resources link at the operational level, there
can be little doubt that tactical planning decisions are
being made in virtual isolation and that project/program
managers must also fight the suboptimization threat. What is
needed "...is a system that focuses attention on specific
goals and objectives, measures performance accurately and
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fairly against those goals and objectives, and provides
...information in forms useful to. .. (management)
"
[Ref. 27: p. ii].
C. DECISION THEORY
Numerous models of decision theory have been developed
since the 1960 's. In one of the earliest, Herbert Simon
advances the theory that the decision process is a function of
three elements: (1) searching the environment for conditions
calling for decision (intelligence) ; (2) inventing, developing,
and analyzing possible courses of action (design) ; and (3)
selecting a particular course of action from those available
(choice) . In developing that concept he concludes that, on
the basis of those three steps, decisions may be considered
as either programmable (all three steps can be automated)
or non-programmable (at least one step cannot be automated)
.
Anthony's decision model approaches the problem fro(u a
different perspective. He divides decision making into: (1)
the process of assuring that specific tasks are carried out
effectively and efficiently (operational control) ; (2) the
process of assuring that resources are obtained and used
effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the
organization's objectives (tactical control); and (3) the
process of deciding on the objectives of the organization
(strategic planning) [Ref. 28: p. 16].
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Anthony's study led, in the mid-19 70 's, to the generally
accepted view, among information system researchers, that
three levels of information systems are required in support
of the three levels of planning and control. These are
illustrated in Figure V-1. In developing those systems, re-
searchers contend that the entire management structure is
supported by a transaction processing system not concerned
with providing information for management in and of itself.
The transaction processing system merely establishes and
maintains the data base through routine day-to-day paperwork
processing.
The assumption that information exists solely to support
decision-making forms the basis for decision support system
research by Keene and Morton. They have developed Simon's
concept of programmability by defining three decision formats:
(1) all steps automated (structured) ; (2) one but not all
steps automated (semi-structured) ; and, (3) no steps automated
(unstructured). Those formats were applied to Anthony's
decision model. The result presented in Figure V-2 is a
matrix structure which directs management toward the structur-
ing of increasingly complex decisions and the potential
advantages associated with extending the decision makers
'
planning range.
Decision theorists suggest that there is a possibility of
structuring "...human cognitive processes and their interaction
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Experience to date supports that possibility. While many
believe "ill-defined" [Ref. 31: p. 148] or "ill-formed"
[Ref. 32: p. 268] problems will always be present, manage-
ment science and operational research "models" have in
recent years provided impressive structure to decisions
previously considered non-programmable.
The 3-M system serves decision makers at the transaction
processing system level. NALCOMIS, through the automation
of existing manual data collection procedures and selected
management tasks will attempt to improve operational control
at the organizational and intermediate levels. NALDA serves
as a structured, integrated data base. What is missing is a
system that puts all of that information to use within an
appropriate, objective-oriented framework. Clearly systems
knowledge has progressed to the point that emphasis can and
should now be directed toward "...entirely new kinds of sys-
tems that dynamically involve the manager's judgment and
support him with analysis, models, and flexible access to
relevant information" [Ref. 33: p. 4].
D. DECISION SUPPORT FRAMEWORK
The continual recycling of information throughout the
organizational structure. Figure V-1, while theoretical,
establishes a basic decision support framework from which
two significant conclusions can be drawn. First, an
integrated approach to the readiness/resource "capability"
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problem requires that quantitative measures be developed which
evaluate deviations from mission-oriented performance objectives
Second, a hierarchical framework must be developed which
provides for the partitioning of strategic objectives down
to the operational control level and the structuring of per-
formance information up to the strategic planning level. The
following two chapters develop an approach to the NAVAIR
readiness/resource planning problem. Chapter VI examines
the development of "I" level performance measures. Chapter
VII integrates those performance measures into a mission-
oriented decision support framework.
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VI. "I" LEVEL PERFORMANCE MEASURES
A. INTRODUCTION
Achievement of the readiness standards established by the
CNO is the principal NAMP objective. This objective provides
the mission-oriented focus essential to the integration of
tactical planning (CNM/NAVAIR) and operational control
(supply/AIMD) logistics functions. Appropriately, perform-
ance with respect to the NAMP objective is measured at the
point at which it is most important, the material conditon
of the aircraft supported. This chapter examines "I" level
performance measures and the extent to which current/planned
measures evaluate deviations from mission-oriented performance
objectives defined in terms of aircraft mission capability.
B. MISSION CAPABILITY
Enclosure (4) to OPNAV instruction 5442. 4H establishes CNO '
s
mission capable (MC) goals by type/model/series (T/M/S) air-
craft and unit operational category. The goals, the "objec-
tive" readiness standards of the NAMP, are defined in terms
of the percentage of time an aircraft is considered to be
mission capable, i.e. the material condition of the aircraft
is such that it can perform at least one and potentially all
of its assigned missions. Determination of specific aircraft/
unit goals is based on a Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP)
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percentage projection of planned numbers of each aircraft
T/M/S compared to primary aircraft inventory (PAI) totals.
The PAI percentage is evaluated in terms of the history of
each program, the importance of each program, and the funding
available. While the overall aircraft mission capable goal
is 70 percent, individual program goals and consequently
support program goals vary. For example, enclosure (4)
,
reprinted in part in Figure VI-1, establishes the goal of a
"non-deployable" AIMD (category 4) tasked with providing
support to the EA-3B aircraft as one of providing sufficient
support to ensure a 48 percent aircraft mission capability
rate.
The basic instruction provides policy guidance for
material conditon reporting. The reporting system presents
a coding procedure which relates particular aircraft systems
and subsystems to specific aircraft missions. Equipment
Operational Capability (EOC) codes identify the systems
required to perform certain missions and, through matrix
construction, the impact of failure of that system on the
aircraft's mission capability. Figure VI-2 is an example of
the mission-essential subsystem matrix. In that example,
failure of equipment 9 would result in a complete loss of
mission capability, the aircraft would be unable to perform





I. All CateRories. A combination of catagories II, III and IV listed below.
H. Deployed Units . All units assigned outside the continental limits of the United
States except station OMD/AIMD and other activities that do not provide direct support
to fleet operations.
in. Workup/Ready Duty Units. Units within ninety (90) days of an extended
deployment, including formal detachments with a PUC and 3-M organization code
assigned.
]V. Other Units . Deployable units not in categories H or IH^ readiness units such as
fleet readiness squadrons, and other permanent units which include all "non-depioyable"
units, station OMD, AIMD, etc.
























Figure VI-1. Mission Capable Goals by Tyoe/Model/Series
Aircraft and Unit Operational Catecorv
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Determining performance with respect to mission capability
goals is relatively simple at the organizational maintenance
level. Subsystem Capability Impact Reporting (SCIR) , a 3-M
system subprogram, documents, through the use of EOC codes,
the amount of time a squadron aircraft is "not mission capable"
(NMC) as a result of either required maintenance or supply
shortage.
At the intermediate level of maintenance aircraft compo-
nents lose their SCIR identity. This is as it should be
since the defective components have entered the supply system,
been replaced in the aircraft by an operational spare, and
no longer have a direct, adverse impact on an aircraft's
mission capability. The problem is, however, that, as a
result of the loss of SCIR identity, repair performance at
the intermediate level is difficult to evaluate with respect
to mission capability goals.
Mission-oriented "I" level performance measures are
fundamental to the NAVAIR resource program planning/justific-
ation task. NAVAIR planners responsible for "I" level auto-
matic test equipment support for example must be able to
determine the extent to which existing test "benches" provide
support before they can be expected to evaluate the "What if?"





D. CURRENT PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Briefly discussed, current measures of intermediate
level maintainance/supply performance include:
* turnaround time (TAT) - average length of time a compo-
nent spends in the repair cycle.
* ready-for-issue (RFI) rate - percentage based on the
number of components repaired by the AIMD and the number of
components inducted for repair.
* beyond the capability of maintenance (BCM) rate -
percentage based on the number of components which cannot be
repaired by the AIMD and must be forwarded to a depot level
repair facility and the number of components inducted for
repair.
* "Y" code rate - percentage based on the number of
repaired components returned for repair with a "Y" when dis-
covered code (received bad from supply) and the number of
components inducted for repair.
* A-799 rate - percentage based on the number of repaired
components returned for repair with a "repeat" discrepancy
and the number of components inducted for repair.
* fill rate - percentage based on the number of requisi-
tions filled within established timeframes and the number of
"valid" requisitions.
* supply response time - average length of time required




* rotatafale pool effectiveness - percentage based on the
number of designated "special interest repairable" requisi-
tions filled and the number of designated "special interest
repairable" requisitions received.
Current measures do not evaluate deviations from mission-
oriented performance objectives. They have little to do
with the mission capability of aircraft. As a result, they
do not serve the "readiness" assessment interests of NAVAIR
"resource" planners. "Current measures. . .focus primarily on
levels of activity" [Ref. 27: p. iii] . They are, at best,
diagnostic indices concerned with the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of intermediate organizational elements.
E. AIMD PERFORMANCE MAITAGEMENT SYSTEM (APMS)
In 1982, the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Support
Office (AIMSO) contracted the Logistics Management Institute
(LMI) to study AIMD performance measures. The study con-
cluded that "in-use" performance measures did not "...
measure relationships between resources applied and missions
accomplished" [Ref. 27: p. iii]. The LMI recognized the
shared "aviation logistics system goal" of local supply and
maintenance activities: "...to achieve and maintain required
readiness levels in a cost effective manner for each (type/
model/series) aircraft..." [Ref. 27: p. iii]. Consistent
with that shared goal, they proposed a comprehensive perfor-
mance management system which would include the readiness
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status of all aircraft, recognize organizational contri-
butions to aircraft readiness, and identity problem areas
which adversely impact readiness. The AIMD Performance
Management System (APMS) is currently under development at
Naval Air Station (NAS) Miramar, California.
The principal features of the APMS include (1) a single
readiness-oriented logistics goal; (2) a set of five per-
formance objectives in support of that goal; (3) a struc-
tured set of performance and diagnostic indices which measure
critical logistics factors in relation to the performance
objectives; and (4) a strategy for representing the performance
information.
The APMS framework, presented in Figure VI-3, facilitates
a description of the system. The "single goal" of the local
logistics process is evaluated in the AIMD performance index.
Represented mathematically below, the AIMD performance index
is derived from the type/model/series (TMS) support indices,
the resource management index, the maintenance production
cost index, and a performance-based target.





TMSSI = type/model/series support index
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RMI = resource management index
MPCI = maintenance production cost index
APT = AIMD performance target
At the objective level, 5 indices measure logistics
performance in support of the "single goal". The "team
performance index" measures performance in relation to the
first objective (maximize support through a local logistics
team effort) . The "production performance index" measures
performance in relation to the second objective (minimize
the dov.mtime of supported aircraft). The "operations support
index" measures performance in relation to the third objec-
tive (minimize launch delays and aborts) . The "resource
management index" measures performance in relation to the
fourth objective (to develop and maintain AIMD capabilities
and resources) . The "maintenance production cost index"
measures performance in relation to the final objective
(productivity at least total cost)
.
At each level, indices are linked, by either type/model/
series aircraft or functional area, to both aircraft readi-
ness and the resources available. Linking is accomplished
through the use of diagnostic indices, many of which cur-
rently serve as AIMD performance measures. For example, the
"beyond the capability of maintenance index is computed in
essentially the same manner as the BCM rate referred to earlier
Under APMS, the index is recognized as a first level diagnostic
index which, when combined with the full repair capability
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index and the test bench capability index, constitutes a
second level diagnostic index referred to as a capability
index. As part of the production performance index, then,
repair capability is computed and evaluated for each type/
model/series aircraft supported by the AIi-lD.
Through the hierarchy of performance indices, the effects
of logistics support program deficiencies on aircraft "mission
capability" rates can be monitored and controlled. Each index,
whether at the AIMD performance level or the first level




Each index represents a percentage of the target achieved
and provides for performance trend analysis, problem identi-
fication, factor comparisons/correlation, and alternative
action analysis.
APMS is "readiness oriented". It is an integrated system
of performance and diagnostic measures designed to support
both the infoinnational and the decision-making requirements
of intermediate level logistics managers assigned operational
control functions. APMS represents a significant step
toward the establishment of a mission link between CNO goals
and squadron operations
.
The APMS is significant for four reasons. First, it
identifies the information elements required (not all required
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by APMS are available through the 3-M system) in the devel-
opment of quantitative measures which evaluate deviations
from "mission" performance objectives. Secondly, the system
develops an extensive set of performance and diagnostic
indices. Thirdly, APMS structures an index-based decision
framework through which performance variables may be consid-
ered together. Lastly, the indices developed under APMS
provide a mission-oriented performance information base
upon which a NAVAIR tactical planning, readiness to resources,
decision support framework may be constructed.
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VII. A FRAMEWORK FOR TACTICAL PLANNING
A. INTRODUCTION
Mission-oriented performance measures are essential to
effective resource management at the operational level.
They do not, however, provide, through simple aggregation,
the information necessary to support resource allocation
planning. In organizational systems, objectives are defined
in increasingly specific terms from the strategic to the
operational level. In the same manner, performance informa-
tion must be restructured to meet the system needs of tactical
planners. This chapter examines the need for a hierarchical
decision support fram.ework through which the perform.ance
measures discussed in Chapter VI can be structured to serve
an integrated control/planning system.
B. GENERAL
Operational control takes place in an established re-
source environment. At the operational level, it is not a
matter of deciding how many test benches are needed but
rather how best to schedule components across available test
benches. "I" level "control" decision support systems col-
lect inform.ation about critical maintenance/supply processes,
flows, and functions, apply scheduling algorithms, and
present decision "options" in formats developed to facilitate
production efficiency decisions. The entire "control"
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decision process lends itself to the application of linear
analytic problem-solving methods as a result of the single
"efficiency" objective and the availability of quantifiable
performance measures.
Tactical planning differs significantly from control. It
is less constrained in terms of perspective, frequently ori-
ented toward multiple objectives, and necessarily more
dependent on subjective judgement. As a result, tactical
planning decision support systems, while based on operational
information, involve much more than the simple accumulation
of "performance" information elements and a wider application
of analytic processes. Tactical decision support systems,
should "...incorporate multiple objectives, deal with many
interacting variables, use aggregate information, and exploit
...judgment within the context of the planning programming
and budgeting process" [Ref. 36: p. 2-11].
C. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
As discussed earlier, NAVAIR program planning is supported
primarily by a structured, integrated data base of aviation
3-M information, stored in NALDA, to which specific applica-
tion programs are applied. Decision support at the tactical
level is dependent on an initial mathematical (usually statis-
tical) analysis of source data, a possible subsequent analysis
utilizing "system.s" techniques, and a final results judgment.




are utilized by individual program planning offices, each is
limited in its potential to serve an integrated NAVAIR tactical
planning process.
A brief review of the prim.ary systems analysis techniques
illustrates the tactical planning limitations associated
with each.
1. Input-Output Analysis
Input-output analysis is a valuable analytic technique.
It has been used, historically, as a strategic planning tool.
While it provides for the consideration of simultaneous and
interactive relationships among num.erous interdependent
variables, it assumes fixed and proportionate relationships
between input and output variables
.
2. Utility Theory
Utility theory measures the value of outcomes in a
"risk" environment. The theory assumes that a decision maker
can translate his judgments about the utility of som.ething to
a cardinal scale and that the utility associated with decision
variables is additive. "Expected utility" (decision costs/
benefits) , is computed in the same way expected value is
computed. T/jhile utility theory exploits judgment, it is
limited to single attribute, or objective, problems.
Application of the theory is extrem.ely difficult in anything




Goal programming adapts linear programming to problem
situations involving multiple objectives. In applying the
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technique, objectives or goals are ranked in order of their
judged importance. Then, through the programming process,
allocation decisions are m.ade which minimize deviations from
the objectives. Goal programming assumes fixed and propor-
tionate relationships among variables and is limited by the
programming linearity requirement.
4. Delphi
Delphi is a statistical method by which "expert"
opinion, or judgment, is exploited and a consensus of opinion
achieved. The process involves anonymous questionnaires, a
statistical review of responses, and follow-on anonymous
requests for adjustments to initial responses. While the
method has been used with impressive success in forecasting,
the design of the questionnaire implies the choice of
variables.
D. THE ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS (AHP)
Recent systems analysis research has resulted in a prom-
ising technique for "modeling" the readiness to resources
problem. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) developed by
Thomas L. Saaty represents the "state of the art" in the
structuring of miltiple and conflicting goals and objectives.
It provides a method for "...breaking down a complex,
unstructured situation into its component parts; arranging
(those) parts, or variables, into a hierarchic order;
assigning numerical values to subjective judgments on the
relative importance of each variable; and synthesizing the
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judgments to determine which variables have the highest
priority and should be acted upon to influence the outcome
of the situation" [Ref. 37: p. 5].
Despite some disadvantages, to be discussed later, the
process draws on the desireable characteristics of existing
systems techniques. Like input-output analysis, AHP estab-
lishes proportionate relationships between numerous interde-
pendent decision variables. The process translates judgment
to a cardinal scale in much the same manner as utility theory.
Like goal programming, AHP deals with multiple objectives.
The process, like Delphi, is designed to output "expert
opinion" consensus. While AHP obtains consensus through an
open group discussion process, it is adaptable to the Delphi
method. Unlike Delphi, AHP incorporates a consistency ratio
which measures the consistency of "group consensus" judgments
throughout a set of pairwise comparisons.
E. PROCESS DESCRIPTION
The following illustrated description of AHP is intended
to provide a general understanding of the process. It is
not a detailed explanation. For reference. Professor Saaty's
book entitled The Analytic Hierarchy Process (see bibliography)
reviews the principles of matrix and eigenvalue theory upon
which the process is based. His later book entitled Decision




1. structuring the Hierarchy
The process begins by laying out elements of the
problem in a hierarchical format. While there are no set
procedures for accomplishing this, Saaty considers an open
discussion between knowledgeable experts the most desireable
technique. Problem objectives and as many elements of the
problem as can be determined are identified. Following
identification of the problem elements, elements are grouped
into disjoint sets to form levels of the hierarchy. The
hierarchy graphically depicts the independence and inter-
dependence of problem elem.ents: it both isolates the relevant
factors and displays them in the larger context of their
relationship to each other and the system as a whole. In the
example. Figure VII-1, market researchers are tasked with
determining the marketability of three brands of paper towels.
They agree that absorption and price are the prim.e determiners
and that those characteristics are evaluated independently
by customers on a high, medimn, or low basis. Three product
brands, x, y, and z, are provided for evaluation. It is
important to note the assumption that the decision makers are
able to "measure" the performance of each brand. In this
example, the direct correlation between price and absorption
is coincidental.
2. Determining Priorities
After a hierarchy of problem elem.ents has been agreed







PERFORMANCE HIGH MEDIUM LOW • HIGH MEDIUM LOW
PRODUCT
BRANDS
Figure VII-1. Marketability Hierarchy
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by level. The technique used by Saaty involves pairwise
comparisons of elements at one level of the hierarchy with
respect to their importance to elements at the next higher
level. Pairwise comparison judgments are quantified through
reference to the pairwise comparison scale. Table VII-I.
Table VII-II presents, in matrix format, the pairwise
comparisons for each level in the product marketability hier-
archy above the decision alternatives level. Development of
the "relative importance" matrices is accomplished by indi-
vidually comparing left-hand column elements with top row
elements. By convention:
* an element in the left-hand column is evaluated with
respect to its dominance over elements in the top row.
* elements compared to them.selves are always assigned
an intensity of importance value of 1 (equal importance)
.
* reciprocal values are entered when a second compar-
ison between elements is required with respect to the same
objective. That is, if element x is assigned an intensity of
importance value of 5 (essential or strong importance) over
element y, then element y has an intensity of importance of
1/5 of element x.
• In the first matrix presented in Table VII-II, market
researchers agree, with respect to the marketability of paper
towels, that price has an intensity of importance value of
5 (essential or strong im.portance) when compared to absorption,
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At the next level in the hierarchy, two matrices are
required. One presents pairwise comparisons between product
performance factors with respect to price. The other presents
pairwise comparisons between product perform.ance factors with
respect to absorption. As might be expected, intensity of
importance comparison values differ depending on which
product characteristic they are being evaluated with respect
to. In Table VII-II, for example, matrix 2 compares high,
medium, and low product performance factors with respect to
price. In row 3 of that example, a low price is assigned an
intensity of importance value of 7 (demonstrated importance)
over a high price. The same product performance factor com-
parison, high to low, conducted in matrix 3 with respect to
absorption results in an intensity of importance value of
5 (essential or strong importance)
.
3. Synthesizing Priorities
Synthesizing pairwise judgments results in a priority
vector for each matrix. This vector, or eigenvector, repre-
sents the relative priority of each element in the left-hand
column with respect to the matrix objective. Eigenvector
compution is a two step, matrix normalization and averaging,
process. Normalization is accomplished by (a) totaling the
values in each matrix column and (b) dividing each value by
its respective column total. Following normalization, rows




Eigenvectors are presented for each matrix in Table
VII-II. In the matrix 1 (marketability) example, the relative
importance of price is 83 percent while the relative importance
of absorption is 17 percent. Eigenvector computations for
matrix 1 are presented in Table VII-III.
4 . Consistency Measures
The consistency of "group" judgments is concerned with
the transitive and proportional relationships between judgments
throughout the set of pairwise comparisons. For example, if
characteristic A is twice as important as characteristic B in
the first comparison, and characteristic B is three times as
important as characteristic C in a second comparison, then
characteristic A must be six times as important as character-
istic C in a third comparison. Saaty refers to this as
"cardinal" consistency in the strength of importance.
The uncertainty involved in judgments virtually
precludes perfect consistency. While perfect consistency is
forced in identical element comparisons (always the value 1)
and transposed comparisons (always the reciprocal value),
there is no process rule which assures perfect transitive and
proportional consistency between several comparisons.
AHP measures the degree of inconsistency between a
set of judgments on the assumption that as long as there is
enough consistency to maintain coherence, the consistency
need not be perfect. An eigenvalue is used to estimate the
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mathematical computation of a consistency index and the sub-
sequent computation of a consistency ratio. Eigenvalues (A)
,
consistency indices (C.I.), and consistency ratios (C.R.) are
presented for matrices 2 and 3 of Table VII-II as several pair-
wise comparisons are involved. The first matrix is perfectly
consistent. Saaty considers consistency ratios less than or
equal to .10 to be acceptable. Ratios greater than .10
indicate excessive randomness between judgments. In the case
of ratios >.10, consideration should be given to restructur-




The next step in the Analytic Hierarchy Process is
the calculation of a composite priority vector for the indivi-
dual matrix eigenvectors. This is accomplished by weighing
each set of values by the priority of the elements they serve
in the next higher level. In Figure VII-2, the resulting row
vector of composite priorities preserves the priorities
established at every level in the hierarchy. The com.posite
priorities at the product performance factor level indicate
the highest market preference for low price (.53), with medium
price ranked second (.23),- and high absorption ranked third
(.11).
6. Evaluating Alternatives
The final step involves the evaluation of alternatives
.
In Figure VII-2, product priorities for each brand have been





















Figure VII-2. Composite Priority Hierarchy
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The product priorities suggest to the researchers that the
marketability of brand z is twice that of brand y and three
times that of brand x.
F. PROCESS ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES
The AHP is a management process of "systemic rationality".
It provides the decision makers with a "... framework ... for
analyzing complex policy issues, where objectives and other
decision criteria may be vaguely defined, and where there
may be conflicting views on how to resolve problems"
[Ref. 36: p. 5-17]. The primary advantages of the process include
* problem element structuring through a hierarchical
integration of functions.
* the integration of deductive and systems approaches.
* a process for dealing with the interdependence of elements
.
* a system for measuring intangibles and establishing
relative priorities.
* a method of tracking the logical consistency of judg-
ments used in determing priorities.
* a method for employing open group discussion or Delphi
techniques to obtain or review "expert" consensus.
* a process by which decision alternatives can be incorpo-
rated into a hierarchy at the lowest level and evaluated on
the basis of a composite priority.
The Analytic Hierarchy Process is limited by:
* the basic assximption that a system, or problem can be
broken down into disjoint levels of independent elements.
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* problems associated with coordinating expert commitment
to and participation in the process.
* difficulties associated with arriving at a consensus on
all problem elements. A lack of consensus on pairwise com-
parisons can be resolved in some instances through the use
of the geometric mean.
* the requirement for computer programming assistance in
the calculation of eigenvalues and eigenvectors for large
matrices.
G. AHP, APMS, AND THE NAVAIR PLANNING PROBLEM
AHP provides a framework and a method through which




To illustrate the potential applicability of AHP to
the "I" level planning problem, the preparedness section of
the readiness taxonomy, presented in Figure II-l, will be
developed as an illustration. This section of the taxonomy
was chosen specifically because APMS provides performance
measures related directly to preparedness. Figure VII-3 is
a graphical depiction of the preparedness hierarchy. In the
illustration, preparedness, an objective element, is consid-
ered to be a function of several things: weapon systems
(program elements) ; how essential components inducted into
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Figure VII-3. Preparedness Hierarchy
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weapon systems (mission elements) ; and how well AIMD repairs
the components inducted (performance indices) . In effect,
SCIR EOC codes are extended to the intermediate level
.
Prior to discussion of the various levels in the
preparedness hierarchy, it is necessary to explain the basic
assumption that was made in developing the illustration. It
has been assumed that the mission essentiality associated
with the repair of a component at the intermediate level is
equal to the mission essentiality of the component to the
weapons system at the operational level. In others words, if
failure of a component in an aircraft results in a "not mis-
sion capable" (NMC) aircraft, that component, whether or not
it has been replaced by a spare, should retain a "mission
critical" repair priority for resource planning purposes.
It is recognized that mission-essential subsystem matrices
and, consequently, equipment operating condition (EOC) codes
"...are not intended to determine supply system priori-
ties..." [Ref. 38: p. 5]. Nevertheless, OPNAV guidance per-
mits EOC codes to be used "...as criterion in determining
Item Mission Essentiality Codes (IMEC's) for supply manage-
ment purposes" [Ref. 38: p. 5]. In the absence of Naval
Supply Systems Command IMEC procedures for aviation components,
it is argued that planners should, as a minira\im, "...give
greater. . .support to ... components whose military worth is
high..., all other things being equal" [Ref. 39: p. B-440]
through the use of EOC codes.
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The NAVAIR objective, presented at the top of Figure
VII-3, establishes an overall logistics planning purpose.
That objective, represented by annual CNO mission capability
goals, can be stated as follows: to plan the allocation of
"I" level resources so as to achieve and maintain the "mission
capable" standards established by the CNO.
At the second level of the hierarchy, elem.ents of the'
objective are identified. In the illustration, the readiness
elements discussed in Chapter II are presented. Prepared-
ness, defined as the ability of intermediate maintenance
activities to repair aircraft components, is independent of
sustainability (supply support), force structure, and force
modernization. In spite of the fact that the objective
elements represent broad concepts and are not directly
measureable, they are easily incorporated into the AHP
hierarchy.
The program element level of the hierarchy is rel-
atively easy to establish. As discussed in Chapter VI, the
relative importance of each weapons system is considered in
the annual process of determining mission capable goals.
Those factors can be utilized in determining the pairwise
comparison values associated with component repair support
priorities for individual weapons systems.
At the mission element level, component essentiality
is considered. Failed components which result in a complete
loss of aircraft mission capability (NMC) are compared with
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those which result in only a partial loss (PMC) and those
which do not impact mission capability (FMC)
.
The performance level of the hierarchy is composed of
those APMS performance indices which are related to prepar-
edness. From Figure VI-3, those 2nd level diagnostic indices
which comprise the Resource Management Index and the Produc-
tion Performance Index are combined with the 1st level Main-
tenance Production Cost per RFI Index as composite preparedness
measures
.
Once a structure of preparedness has been agreed upon,
the AHP steps of priority weighing, consistency measurement,
and composite priority determination can be applied.
2. Method
NAMP planning is particularly suited to the AHP method.
In the first place, NAMP policies are reviewed annually by
program experts who gather in an open forum under the direc-
tion of the NAMP policy committee. An extension of that
planning forum's responsibilities to include the development
and review of resource allocation planning priorities appears
to be a logical and particularly valuable "policy" opportunity.
Secondly, the program office structure of NAVAIR supports the
AHP method. Office responsibilities, for the most part, match
the performance index breakdowns. For example, NAVAIR plan-
ners assigned responsibility for Precision Measuring Equipment
(PME) have extensive information on the condition, calibration,
and availability of that equipment. What they do not have is
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performance information associated with the essentiality,
or priority, of that equipment to the repair of NMC, PMC, and
FMC components. Through the AHP, an application of a standard
method to various aircraft and EOC code data sorts provides a
method for obtaining that information.
H. OTHER PROJECTED USES
There are several other potentially valuable uses for the
AHP "model". In each instance the composite priorities
would be evaluated against performance indices and operational
level "mission capable" rates.
1. System Resource Allocations
The primary worth of the model appears to be associ-
ated with improved resource management. Through its use,
NAVAIR planners would not only be able to determine program
strengths/weaknesses, they would be able to assess those
strengths/weaknesses on the basis of their importance to
weapons system readiness. Comparisons between the performance
of support programs and the mission capability of weapons
systems would provide historical and trend information upon
which "readiness oriented" resource allocation/reallocation
decisions could be based.
2. Program Resource Allocations
Through aircraft type equipment code data sorts , the
AHP structure could be utilized to evaluate a program's
performance with respect to a single weapon system. Further
information sorts by EOC codes could provide a prioritized
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evaluation of a program's performance with respect to FMC,
PMC, and NMC aircraft conditions.
3 . Organizational Evaluation
AHP structuring of the readiness to resources
problem provides an opportunity for development of an
"objective" AIMD performance measurement system. By
eliminating the weapon system level of the hierarchy (in
effect, assuming equal importance of weapon systems) one
AIMD's performance could be compared to another's. The
sum of composite priority values times the percent perfor-
mance in each area would result in a composite score. Levels
of activity measures would give way to an emphasis on levels





VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Research conducted in conjunction with this study has
consisted principally of a review and analysis of NAMP program
reports information and contemporary information/decision
systems theory. An attempt has been made to provide a sys-
tems perspective to the NAMP intermediate repair "readiness
to resources" problem. Numerous NAMP program initiatives
deal with functional elements of the specific "I" level
planning problem. It is suggested that structuring of the
problem elements is required before any program initiatives
can be expected to provide measureable resource allocation
inprovements . The study has demonstrated the use of the
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) "model" as a technique for
integrating program elements throughout all levels of manage-
ment. More importantly, the study has emphasized that today,
"...when a naval task group goes to sea, its (capability)
...will depend on factors imposed by. . .policy makers who
over the last several years have allocated financial resources
in ways that largely determine the Task Group Commander '
s
ability to make his force ready" [Ref. 40: p. 21].
B. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions are presented:
1. NAVAIR planners tasked with budgeting intermediate
level support for the Naval Aviation Plan face an extremely
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difficult assignment. Responsible for costing "what if?"
resource requirements in support of a "readiness" objective,
they must operate in an obscure environment in which readi-
ness is not defined in terms of its elements but is instead
represented by an operational measure not directly related
to "I" level performance. The absence of a defined objec-
tive has resulted in obscure performance goals, a "fall
back" emphasis on operational efficiency (level of activity
measures), and suboptimization of support elements.
2. The existing "I" level planning process is supported
by a complexly integrated information system (3-M) which makes
aggregated information available to NAVAIR application
programs. 3-M program emphasis, reflected in the NALCOMIS/
NALDA program initiatives, continues to be on the collection
and distribution of information. While equipment repair data,
including cost data, is available through 3-M, the system does
not incorporate standard "I" level measures of performance
relative to the mission essentiality of equipment.
3. Recognition by OPNAV of the requirement for a "systems"
approach to the "I" level readiness to resources problem
resulted in the establishment of AIMSO. Tasked with develop-
ing the "methods link", AIMSO, through the LMI, has made
tremendous progress in defining AIMD performance measures.
The AIMD Performance Management System (APMS) , initially
being developed for use at the operational level, provides a
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performance related foundation upon which a tactical planning,
readiness to resource, decision support framework can be
based.
4. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) offers exceptional
promise for conducting an analysis of complex logistics
problems. Based on hierarchical structuring, the "model"
integrates performance indices with institutional knowledge
(judgment) , considers multiple objectives at each level in
directing managerial analysis toward a unified focus, and
provides a consistency measure throughout.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are offered:
1. It is recommended that AIMSO expand current "I" level
programs research to include: (1) development of a tactical
decision support framework for NAMP planning; (2) development
of sustainability, force structure, and force modernization
"performance" measures; and (3) an evaluation of the Analytic
Hierarchy Process (AHP) as a technique for integrating
readiness/resource planning. Consideration should be given
to accomplishing this research through an extension of the
Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) perform-
ance measures research program currently contracted to the
Logistics Management Institute.
2. It is recommended that OPNAV planners begin tailoring
NALCOMIS (source data collection and program application




3, In the absence of an "I" level repair item essentiality
coding system, it is recommended that the NAMP policy com-
mittee consider incorporating SCIR EOC coding into "I" level
documentation procedures. Resource requirements planning as
a minimum must be capable of approximating the full mission
capable (FMC)
,
partial mission capable (PMC) , and not mission
capable (NMC) impact of "I" level component maintenance/
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